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THE IMPORTANCE OF REPLICATION IN WILDLIFE RESEARCH 
DOUGLAS H. JOHNSON,1 U.S. Geological Survey, Northern Prairie Wildlife Research Center, Jamestown, ND 58401, USA 
Abstract: Wildlife ecology and management studies have been widely criticized for deficiencies in design or analy- 
sis. Manipulative experiments-with controls, randomization, and replication in space and time-provide power- 
ful ways of learning about natural systems and establishing causal relationships, but such studies are rare in our 
field. Observational studies and sample surveys are more common; they also require appropriate design and analy- 
sis. More important than the design and analysis of individual studies is metareplication: replication of entire stud- 
ies. Similar conclusions obtained from studies of the same phenomenon conducted under widely differing condi- 
tions will give us greater confidence in the generality of those findings than would any single study, however well 
designed and executed. 
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Wildlife researchers seem to be doing everything 
wrong. Few of our studies employ the hypotheti- 
co-deductive approach (Romesburg 1981) or gain 
the benefits from strong inference (Platt 1964). 
We continually conduct descriptive studies, rather 
than the more effective manipulative studies. We 
rarely select study areas at random, and even less 
often do the animals we study constitute a random 
sample. We continue to commit pseudoreplication 
errors (Hurlbert 1984, Heffner et al. 1996). We 
confuse correlation with causation (Eberhardt 
1970). Frequently we measure the wrong vari- 
ables such as indices to things we really care 
about (Anderson 2001). And we may measure 
them in the wrong places (convenience sampling; 
Anderson 2001). We often apply meaningless 
multivariate methods to the results of our studies 
(Rexstad et al. 1988). We test null hypotheses that 
not only are silly but are known to be false (Cher- 
ry 1998,Johnson 1999, Anderson et al. 2000). We 
rely on nonparametric methods that are neither 
necessary nor appropriate (Johnson 1995). 
Such problems permeate our field. In my early 
years as a hypercritical statistician, I read many 
articles in The Journal of Wildlife Management and 
related journals. In virtually every article, I found 
problems-often serious ones-in the methods 
used to analyze data. That experience was repeat- 
ed later in a class in evolutionary ecology. During 
that class, we critically reviewed many key papers 
in evolutionary ecology. Some students were 
I E-mail: Douglas_H_Johnson@usgs.gov 
assigned to attack, others to defend those articles. 
We identified substantial problems in the design, 
analysis, or interpretation in nearly all of those 
influential and highly regarded studies. 
Despite all our transgressions, we must be 
doing something right. We have brought some 
species back from the brink of extinction. The 
bald eagle (Haliaeetus leucocephalus), whooping 
crane (Grus americana), Aleutian Canada goose 
(Branta canadensis leucopareia), and gray wolf 
(Canis lupus) were extremely rare over much or 
all of their range only a few years ago; now they 
are much more common. Many of us had given 
up on the black-footed ferret (Mustela nigripes) 
and California condor (Gymnogyps californianus), 
species that, while still at risk, appear to be recov- 
ering. And we can manage for abundance if we 
want to, such as we have done for white-tailed 
deer (Odocoileus virginianus) and mallards (Anas 
platyrhynchos). Recently, Jack Ward Thomas spoke 
of the "tremendous record of success" in our 
field (Thomas 2000:1). 
Why this apparent inconsistency between our 
error-prone methods and the successes of our 
profession? I hope to address that question here 
by discussing what truly is important in scientific 
research. I first discuss causation, then manipula- 
tive experimentation as a powerful way of learn- 
ing about causal mechanisms. The 3 cornerstones 
of experimentation are control, randomization, 
and replication. These features also are integral 
to observational studies and sample surveys, 
which are more common in our field. For those 
types of studies especially, I argue that the most 
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important feature is replication. Further, I ex- 
pand this concept to the level of metareplica- 
tion-replication of entire studies-and suggest 
that this is the most reliable method of learning 
about the world. It is a natural way of human 
thinking and is consistent with a Bayesian 
approach to statistical inference. Metareplication 
allows us to exploit the values of small studies, 
each of which individually may be unable to 
reach definitive conclusions. Metareplication 
provides us greater confidence that certain rela- 
tionships are general and not specific to the cir- 
cumstances that prevailed during a single study. 
CAUTION ABOUT CAUSATION 
The "management" in "wildlife management" 
implies causality. We believe we can perform some 
management action that will produce a pre- 
dictable response by wildlife. Even if the causes 
cannot be manipulated, it is useful to know the 
mechanisms that determine certain outcomes, 
such as that spring migration of birds is a response 
to increasing day length, or that drought reduces 
the number of wetland basins that contain water. 
The concept of causation is most readily adopt- 
ed in the physical sciences, where models of the 
behavior of atoms, planets, and other inanimate 
objects are applicable over a wide range of con- 
ditions (Barnard 1982) and the controlling factors 
are few (e.g., pressure and temperature are suffi- 
cient to determine the volume of a gas). In the 
physical sciences, causality implies lawlike neces- 
sity. In many fields, however, notions of causality 
reduce to those of probability, which suggests 
exceptions and lack of regularity. Here, causation 
means that an action "tends to make the conse- 
quence more likely, not absolutely certain" (Pearl 
2000:1). This is so in wildlife ecology because of 
the multitude of factors that influence a system. 
For example, liberalizing hunting regulations for a 
species tends to increase harvest by hunters. In any 
specific instance, liberalization may not result in 
an increased harvest because of other influences 
such as population size of the species, weather 
conditions during the hunting season, and the 
cost of gasoline as it affects hunter activity. 
Suppose you want to determine the effect on 
squirrel abundance of some treatment (= puta- 
tive cause), for example, selective logging in a 
woodlot by removing all trees greater than 45 cm 
diameter at breast height (dbh). The treatment 
effect on some woodlot can be defined as 
T= Y,(u) - Y(u), 
where Yt(u) is the number of squirrels in woodlot 
u after the treatment, and Y (u) is the number of 
squirrels in that woodlot if the treatment had not 
been applied (I follow Rubin [1974] and Holland 
[1986] here). If the woodlot is logged, then you 
can observe Y( u) but not Y( u). If the treatment 
is not applied, then you can observe Y( u) but not 
Yt(u). Thus arises the fundamental problem of 
causal inference: you cannot observe the values 
of Yt(u) and Yc(u) on the same unit. That is, any 
particular woodlot is either logged or not. 
Holland (1986) described 2 solutions to this 
problem. With the first, one has 2 units (u1 and 
u2, here woodlots) and assumes they are identical. 
Then the treatment effect Tis estimated to be 
T= Y,(ul)- Y(2), (2) 
where u1 is treated and u2 is not. This approach is 
based on the very strong assumption that the 2 
woodlots, if not logged, would have the same 
number of squirrels, that is, Y( u2) = Yc(ul). That 
assumption is not testable, of course, because 1 
woodlot had been logged. It can be made more 
plausible by matching the 2 units as closely as pos- 
sible or by believing that the units are identical. 
That latter belief comes more easily to physicists 
thinking about molecules than to ecologists 
thinking about woodlots, however. 
Holland (1986) termed the other solution sta- 
tistical. One gets an expected, or average, causal 
effect T over the units in some population: 
(3) 
where, unlike with the other solution, different 
units can be observed. The statistical solution 
replaces the causal effect of the treatment on a 
specific unit, which is impossible to observe, by 
the average causal effect in the population, which 
is possible to estimate. 
This discussion reflects the need for a control, 
something to compare with the treated unit, 
which is required for either approach. To follow 
the statistical approach, we often invoke random- 
ization. If, for example, we are to compare squir- 
rel numbers on a treated woodlot and an 
untreated one, we might get led astray if the 
woodlots were of very different size, or if one con- 
tained more mast trees, or if one was rife with 
predators of squirrels and the other was not. One 
way-but not the only way-to protect against 
this possibly misleading outcome is to determine 
at random which woodlot receives the treatment 
J. Wildl. Manage. 66(4):2002 
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and which does not. This can be done if the re- 
searcher has tight control over the experiment; it 
is impossible in many "natural experiments" and 
observational studies. 
But even if you select at random a woodlot for 
treatment and another as a control, you still may 
end up by chance comparing a large woodlot that 
has numerous mast trees and few predators with 
a woodlot with opposite characteristics. This 
leads to the third important criterion for deter- 
mining causation: replication. Repeating the ran- 
domization process and treatments on several 
woodlots reduces the chance that woodlots in any 
group consistently are more favorable to squir- 
rels. In summary, then, assessing the effect of 
some treatment with a manipulative experiment 
requires a control, randomization, and replica- 
tion (Fisher 1926). 
One might attempt to determine the effect of 
selective logging on squirrels by comparing 
woodlots that have trees greater than 45 cm dbh 
with woodlots that lack such large trees. But such 
a comparison is not as definitive as a manipula- 
tive experiment. The 2 types of woodlots might 
differ in numerous ways, other than the presence 
or absence of large trees, that influence squirrel 
abundance. If variables that are known or sus- 
pected to be influential are measured, careful sta- 
tistical analysis may account for their effects, but 
large samples may be necessary, and it is possible 
that an important variable went unmeasured. 
An ideal design might involve a number of 
woodlots on which squirrel density is measured 
both before and after the treatment is applied. 
Then, instead of comparing the density of squir- 
rels on treated versus untreated woodlots, one 
could compare the change in density (before and 
after treatment) between the 2 groups. Crossover 
designs also provide a powerful way to reduce the 
influence of inherent differences among experi- 
mental units. Under a crossover design, for a cer- 
tain time period, some units receive treatments 
and other units serve as controls. Then the roles 
of the units switch: control units receive treat- 
ments and formerly treated units are left alone to 
serve as controls. An obvious concern with 
crossover designs is that treatment effects may 
persist. One remedy is to have a time period be- 
tween the 2 phases of the study sufficient to allow 
treatment effects to dissipate. A crossover design 
would not be appropriate for the squirrel-wood- 
lot example because the effect of logging would 
persist for decades, if not longer. Crossover 
designs were used by Balser et al. (1969) and Tap- 
per et al. (1996) to estimate the effects of preda- 
tor reduction on prey species. In these studies, 
predators were removed from 1 study area for 3 
years, while another area served as a control; 
after 3 years, the treatments were switched. 
Correlation versus Causation: 
the Importance of Mechanisms 
It is always useful to have an understanding of 
the mechanisms that influence phenomena of 
interest and to distinguish causation from corre- 
lation. We might be able to relate mallard pro- 
duction to precipitation (Boyd 1981), but more 
useful is the understanding that precipitation 
affects the condition of wetlands where mallards 
breed, which in turn influences breeding propen- 
sity, clutch size, and survival of young (Johnson et 
al. 1992). We can have greater confidence in our 
findings if they are consistent with mechanisms 
that are both reasonable and supported by other 
evidence. The presence of such mechanisms gives 
credibility that the correlational smoke may in 
fact represent causational fire (Holland 1986). 
Romesburg (1981) argued that causation may be 
invoked if the correlational evidence is accompa- 
nied by, for example, the elimination of other 
possible causes, demonstration that the correla- 
tion occurs under a wide variety of circumstances, 
and the existence of a plausible dependence 
between the putative cause and the outcome. In 
a similar vein, mechanistic models are more use- 
ful than descriptive models for understanding 
systems (Johnson 2001 a, Nichols 2001). 
MANIPULATE, IF YOU CAN 
Manipulative experimentation is a very effec- 
tive way to determine causal relationships. One 
poses questions to nature via experiments such as 
selective logging. By manipulating the system 
yourself, you reduce the chance that something 
other than your treatment causes the results that 
are observed. Further, as emphasized by Macnab 
(1983), little can be learned about the dynamics 
of systems at equilibrium. Manipulation is helpful 
to understand how the systems respond to 
changes. Experimentation also forms the basis of 
what has been termed strong inference (Platt 
1964), in which alternative hypotheses are 
devised and crucial experiments are performed 
to exclude 1 or more of the hypotheses. 
Wildlife ecologists sometimes face severe diffi- 
culties meeting the needs of control, randomiza- 
tion, and replication in manipulative experiments. 
Many systems are too large and complex for ecol- 
J. Wildl. Manage. 66(4):2002 
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ogists to manipulate (Macnab 1983). Often "treat- 
ments"-such as oil spills-are applied by others, 
and wildlife ecologists are called in to evaluate 
their effects. In such situations, randomization is 
impossible and replication undesirable. Methods 
for conducting environmental studies, other than 
experiments with replications, are available 
(Smith and Sugden 1988, Eberhardt and Thomas 
1991); among these are experiments without repli- 
cations, observational studies, and sample surveys. 
Replication is particularly difficult with experi- 
ments at the ecosystem level, which are more com- 
plex but also more meaningful than experiments 
at microcosm or mesocosm levels, where replica- 
tion is more feasible (Carpenter 1990, 1996; 
Schindler 1998). Experiments lacking replications 
can be, and indeed often have been, analyzed by 
taking multiple measurements of the system and 
treating them as independent replicates. This 
practice was criticized by Eberhardt (1976) and 
Hurlbert (1984), the latter naming it pseudo- 
replication. I address this topic more fully below. 
Observational studies lack the critical element 
of control by the investigator, although they can 
be analyzed similarly to an experimental study 
(Cochran 1983). One is less certain that the pre- 
sumed treatment actually caused the observed 
response, however. In lieu of controlled experi- 
mentation, one can (1) reduce the influence of 
extraneous effects by restricting the scope of 
inference to situations similar to the one under 
observation; (2) employ matching, by which 
treated units are compared with units that were 
not treated but in other regards are as similar as 
possible to the treated units; or (3) adjust for the 
effects of other variables during analysis, with 
methods such as analysis of covariance (Eber- 
hardt and Thomas 1991). 
Longitudinal observational studies, with mea- 
surements taken before and after some treat- 
ment, generally are more informative than cross- 
sectional observational studies, in which treated 
and untreated units are studied only after the 
treatment (Cox and Wermuth 1996). (Of course, 
measurements on experimental and control 
units before and after treatments are highly desir- 
able in experimental studies, as well as observa- 
tional studies.) Intervention analysis is a method 
used to assess the effect of some distinct treat- 
ment (intervention) that has been applied to a 
system. The intervention was not assigned by the 
investigator and cannot reasonably be replicated. 
One approach is to model the system as a time 
series and look for changes subsequent to the 
intervention. That approach was taken with air- 
quality data by Box and Tiao (1975), who sought 
to determine how ozone levels might have 
responded to events such as a change in the for- 
mulation of gasoline. 
Sometimes it is known that a major treatment will 
be applied at some particular site such as a dam to 
be constructed on a river. It may be feasible to 
study that river before as well as after the dam is 
constructed. That simple before-and-after com- 
parison suffers from the weakness that any change 
that occurred coincidental with dam construction, 
such as a decrease in precipitation, would be con- 
founded with changes resulting from the dam, 
unless the changes were specifically included in 
the model. To account for the effects of other vari- 
ables, one can study similar rivers during the same 
before-and-after period. Ideally, these rivers would 
be similar to and close enough to the treated 
river so to be equally influenced by other variables 
but not influenced by the treatment itself. This 
design has been called the BACI (before-after, 
control-impact) design (Stewart-Oaten et al. 
1986, Stewart-Oaten and Bence 2001, Smith 2002) 
and is used for assessing the effects of impacts. 
It is difficult for investigators to manipulate 
large and complex systems such as ecosystems. 
But wildlife managers, as well as those who man- 
age ecosystems for other objectives such as tim- 
ber production, do so frequently. This disparity 
between investigators and managers led Macnab 
(1983) to recommend that management activities 
be viewed as experiments that offer opportunities 
to learn about large systems. Actions taken for 
management benefits generally lack controls, 
randomization, and replication; such shortcom- 
ings can be remedied by incorporating these fea- 
tures into the experiment. Key assumptions 
should be identified and stated as hypotheses, 
rather than treated as facts. The results of man- 
agement actions, even if they show no effect, 
should be measured and reported. 
The adaptive resource management approach 
blends the idea of learning about a system with 
the management of the system (Walters 1986, 
Williams et al. 2002). The key notion, which 
moves the concept beyond a "try something and 
if it doesn't work try something else" attitude, is 
that knowledge about the system becomes one of 
the products of the system that is to be optimized. 
Sample surveys differ from experiments in that 
one endeavors either to estimate some character- 
istic over some domain-such as the number of 
mallards in the major breeding range in North 
J. Wildl. Manage. 66(4):2002 
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America-or to compare variables among 
groups-such as the median age of hunters com- 
pared with nonhunters. 
CONTROLS 
The term control, confusingly, has at least 3 dif- 
ferent meanings in experimental design. The 
first meaning, which is more general and not 
specifically addressed here, involves the investiga- 
tor's role. In a controlled study, the treatment 
(cause) is assigned by the investigator; the study 
is an experiment. In an uncontrolled study, the 
treatment is determined to some extent by fac- 
tors beyond the investigator's control; the study is 
observational (Holland 1986). The second mean- 
ing, design control, implies that, while some 
experimental units receive a treatment, others 
(the "controls") do not. The third meaning, sta- 
tistical control, means that other variables that 
may influence the response are measured so that 
we may estimate their effects and attempt to elim- 
inate them statistically. 
The major benefit of design control is to pro- 
vide a basis for comparison between treated and 
untreated units. It reduces the error; our mea- 
sured response is likely to reflect only the treat- 
ment rather than a variety of other things. Statis- 
tical control usually is less effective in reducing 
error and is applied after treatments are applied. 
Sometimes strict design controls are not possible. 
Intervention analysis and BACI designs can 
demonstrate that some variables may have changed 
subsequent to the intervention or impact, but 
one will be less confident from that analysis that 
the intervention caused that change. Confidence 
will increase if potential confounding variables are 
measured and their effects are accounted for dur- 
ing analysis-that is, through statistical control. 
Controls should be distinguished from refer- 
ence units. The latter are units that represent 
some ideal that management actions are intended 
to approach. Reference sites are especially useful 
in restoration ecology, when evaluating the effec- 
tiveness of alternative management activities for 
restoring degraded areas to conditions embodied 
in the reference sites (Provencher et al. 2002). 
RANDOMIZATION 
Randomization can occur at 2 levels. In both 
experiments and sample surveys, randomization 
means that the objects to be studied are randomly 
selected from some population (called a target 
population) for which inference is desired. Accord- 
ingly, each member of that population has some 
chance of being included in the sample. Chances 
may be the same for all members, but that is not 
necessary. At a second level, in a manipulative 
experiment, randomization means that the treat- 
ment each unit receives is randomly determined. 
Randomization makes variation among sample 
units, due to variables that are not accounted for, 
act randomly, rather than in some consistent and 
potentially misleading manner. Randomization 
thereby reduces the chance of confounding with 
other variables. Instead of controlling for the 
effects of those unaccounted-for variables, ran- 
domization makes them tend to cancel one 
another out, at least in large samples. In addition, 
randomization reduces any intentional or unin- 
tentional bias of the investigator. It further pro- 
vides an objective probability distribution for a 
test of significance (Barnard 1982). 
While randomizing the assignment of treat- 
ments to units is crucial in experimentation, I 
suggest that randomization in selecting the units 
in an experiment or sample survey is less impor- 
tant than control or replication. First, the intend- 
ed benefits of randomization apply only concep- 
tually. Randomly sampling from a population 
does not ensure that the resulting sample will 
represent that population, only that, if many such 
samples are taken, the average will be represen- 
tative. But in reality only a single sample is taken, 
and that single sample may or may not be repre- 
sentative. Randomization does make variation act 
randomly, rather than systematically. However, 
this property is only conceptual, applying to the 
notion that samples were repeatedly taken ran- 
domly. The single sample that was taken may or 
may not have properties that appear systematic. 
Randomization ostensibly reduces hidden biases 
of, or "cheating" by, an investigator. But, if an 
investigator wishes to cheat, why not do so but say 
that randomization was employed (Harville 1975)? 
What Does a Sample Really Represent? 
Any sample, even a nonrandom one, can be 
considered a representative sample from some 
population, if not the target population. What is 
the population for which the sample is represen- 
tative? Extrapolation beyond the area from which 
any sample was taken requires justification on 
nonstatistical bases. For example,, studies of ani- 
mal behavior (or physiology) based on only a few 
individuals may reasonably be generalized to 
entire species if the behavior patterns (or physio- 
logical processes) are relatively fixed (i.e., the 
units are homogeneous with respect to that fea- 
J. Wildl. Manage. 66(4):2002 
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ture). In contrast, traits that vary more widely, 
such as habitat use of a species or annual survival 
rates, cannot be generalized as well from a sam- 
ple of comparable size. Consistency of a feature 
among the sampled and unsampled units is more 
critical than the randomness of a sample. Can 
one comfortably draw an inference to a popula- 
tion from a sample, even if that sample is non- 
random? In reality, most useful inferences 
require extrapolation beyond the sampled popu- 
lation. For example, if we want to predict the con- 
sequences of some action carried out in the 
future based on a study conducted in the past, we 
are extrapolating forward in time. 
Is Randomization Always Good? 
Suppose you want to assess the characteristics 
of vegetation in a 10-ha field. You decide to place 
8 quadrats in the field and measure vegetation 
within each of those quadrats. Results from those 
8 samples will be projected to the entire field. You 
can select the 8 points entirely at random. It is 
possible that all 8 quadrats will be within the same 
small area of the field, however, and be very dif- 
ferent from most of the field. Choosing points at 
random ensures that, if you repeat the process 
many times, on average you will have a represen- 
tative sample. But in actuality you have only 1 of 
the infinitely many possible samples; randomness 
tells you nothing about your particular sample. It 
might be perfectly representative of the entire 
field, or it might be very deviant. The chance that 
it is representative increases with sample size, so 
the risk of a random sample not being represen- 
tative is especially troublesome in small samples. 
There are methods for taking samples to in- 
crease the chance that they better represent the 
entire field. One method is to stratify, if there is 
prior knowledge of some variable likely to relate 
to the variable of interest. Another method is to 
take systematic rather than random samples. 
Hurlbert (1984) emphasized the importance of 
interspersion in experimental design, having 
units well distributed in space; this serves 1 goal 
of randomization, often more successfully. Such 
balanced designs diminish the errors of an exper- 
iment (Fisher 1971). 
What Is Independence, and Is It Necessary? 
Randomization provides a basis for probability 
distributions because the observations in a ran- 
dom sample generally are statistically indepen- 
dent. Independence is a mathematically won- 
drous property, since it facilitates the definition 
of distributional properties, such as the variance, 
test statistics, and P-values. But what is indepen- 
dent? Consider, as did Millspaugh et al. (1998), 
the assessment of habitat preference of animals 
that occur together. If the animals are inextrica- 
bly tied together, such as a mother and her 
dependent offspring, then the locations of each 
certainly are not independent. If the animals 
occur together simply because they favor the same 
habitats, Millspaugh et al. (1998) argued that the 
individual animals are independently making 
habitat choices and thus should be treated as 
independent units. Then there are intermediate 
situations, such as a mother and her not-quite- 
dependent offspring. Ascertaining independence 
is not a simple matter; statistical independence 
can be evaluated only in reference to a specific 
data set and a specified model (Hurlbert 1997). 
But what is the problem if data are not indepen- 
dent? Suppose you have 100 observations, but only 
50 of them are independent, and for each of those 
there is another observation that is identical to it. 
So the apparent sample size is 100, but only 50 of 
those are independent. If you estimate the average 
of some characteristic of the individuals, the mean 
in fact will be a good estimator. But the standard 
error will be biased low. And a test statistic, say, for 
comparing the mean of that group with another, 
will be inflated and will tend to reject the null 
hypothesis too often (e.g., Erickson et al. 2001). 
This is a fundamental problem for any test sta- 
tistic from an individual study. There are ways to 
correct for the disparity between the number of 
observations and the number of independent 
observations. Dependencies among observations 
sometimes can be modeled explicitly, such as with 
generalized estimating equations (Liang and 
Zeger 1986). Dependencies, such as sampling 
from clusters of units, often result in overdisper- 
sion, in which the sample variance exceeds the 
theoretical value; in such cases certain adjust- 
ments to the theoretical variance can be made 
(McCullagh and Nelder 1989, Burnham and 
Anderson 2002). A similar issue arises with respect 
to temporally or spatially correlated observations. 
I argue later that problems caused by a lack of 
independence, while affecting inferences from 
individual studies, are less consequential than 
they appear. 
Independence and the Scope of Inference 
Suppose you are investigating area sensitivity in 
grassland birds. That is, you wonder whether cer- 
tain species prefer larger patches of grassland to 
J. Wildl. Manage. 66(4):2002 
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smaller patches. Area sensitivity might be mani- 
fested by reduced densities (not just total abun- 
dance) in smaller habitat patches or by the avoid- 
ance of habitat edges (Faaborg et al. 1993,Johnson 
and Winter 1999, Johnson 2001 b). Avoidance of 
edge means that birds are restricted to the interi- 
or portions of a patch, which results in reduced 
densities for the patch as a whole. To determine 
whether certain species are area-sensitive, you 
might compare densities of the species in patch- 
es of similar habitat but different size. Alterna- 
tively, you might examine the locations of birds 
(let's say nests, but we could consider song perch- 
es, etc.) within a habitat patch and determine 
whether there is evidence that densities of nests 
are reduced near edges compared to interiors. 
For comparing densities, the sample units are 
patches. Those are the units to which a "treat- 
ment" (patch size) pertains; all birds in that 
patch have the same patch size. For examining 
edge avoidance, in contrast, the sample units are 
nests because each has its own, possibly unique, 
value of the "treatment" (distance to edge). Log- 
ically, then, the latter approach would be more 
powerful because a single patch might produce 
dozens of sample units (nests), resulting in much 
larger sample sizes. 
Assuming there is no free lunch, what is happen- 
ing here? The disparity is the scope of inference. If 
we study densities in patches, the studied patches 
can be considered a sample from some target pop- 
ulation of patches, and inferences should apply to 
that population. If we study nests within a patch 
and examine distances to an edge, the inference 
is only to that single patch. You might conclude 
that birds avoid locating their nests near a habitat 
edge, but that conclusion applies only locally. 
Replication Is Necessary for Randomization 
to Be Useful 
The properties of randomization in the selec- 
tion of units to study are largely conceptual; that 
is, they pertain hypothetically to some long-term 
average. For example, randomization makes 
errors act randomly, rather than in a consistent 
direction. But in any single observation, or any 
single study, the error may well be consistent. It is 
only through replication that long-term proper- 
ties hold. 
REPLICATION 
Replication requires that a sample consist of 
more than 1 member of a population, or that 
treatments be applied independently to more 
than 1 unit. Replication provides 2 benefits. First, 
it reduces error because an average of indepen- 
dent errors tends to be smaller than a single 
error. Replication serves to ensure against mak- 
ing a decision based on a single, possibly unusu- 
al, outcome of a treatment or measurement of a 
unit. Second, because we have several estimates 
of the same effect, we can estimate the error, as 
the variation in those estimates reflects error. We 
then can determine whether the value of the treat- 
ed units are unusually different from those of the 
untreated units. The validity of that estimate of 
error depends on the experimental units having 
been drawn randomly; thus, the validity is ajoint 
property of randomization and replication. 
Is Replication Always Necessary? 
Imagine yourself cooking a stew. You want to see 
if it needs salt. You dip a teaspoon into the kettle 
and take a taste. If it's not salty enough, you add 
more salt. Notice that you did not take replicate 
samples. Only one. (Further, you probably didn't 
randomly select where in the kettle to sample; 
you most certainly took it from the surface and 
most likely near the center of the kettle.) Cooks 
have been using this sampling approach for prob- 
ably centuries, without evident problem. Why? 
The single, nonrandomly selected sample gen- 
erally suffices because the stew is fairly homoge- 
neous with respect to salt. A teaspoon from 1 
location will be about as salty as a teaspoon from 
another. This is because the stew has been stirred. 
Note that the same approach would not work for 
sampling meat, which is distributed less uniform- 
ly throughout a stew. Replication may not be nec- 
essary if all the members of the universe are iden- 
tical, or nearly enough so. 
OTHER LEVELS OF REPLICATION 
I find it useful to think of replication occurring 
at 3 different levels (Table 1). The fundamental 
notion is of ordinary replication in an experi- 
ment: treatments are applied independently to 
several units. In our squirrel-woodlot example, 
we would want several woodlots to be logged and 
several to be left as controls. (Comparable con- 
siderations apply to observational studies or sam- 
ple surveys.) As mentioned above, replication 
serves to ensure against making a decision based 
on a single, possibly unusual, outcome of the 
treatment. It also provides an estimate of the vari- 
ation associated with the treatment. Other levels 
of replication are pseudoreplication and meta- 
replication. 
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Table 1. The types of replication differ in what actions are repeated, what scope of inference is valid, and the role of P-values. 
Term Repeated action Scope of inference P-value Analysis 
Pseudoreplication Measurement Object measured Wrong Pseudo-analysis 
Ordinary replication Treatment Objects for which samples are representative "OK" Analysis 
Metareplication Study Situations for which studies are representative Irrelevant Meta-analysis 
Pseudoreplication 
At a lower level than ordinary replication is what 
Hurlbert (1984) called pseudoreplication. Often 
couched in analysis of variance terms (using the 
wrong error term in an analysis), typically it arises 
by repeating measurements on units and treating 
such measurements as if they represented inde- 
pendent observations. The treatments may have 
been assigned randomly and independently to 
the units, but repeated observations on the same 
unit are not independent. This was what Hurlbert 
(1984) called simple pseudoreplication and what 
Eberhardt (1976) had included in pseudodesign. 
Pseudoreplication was common when Hurlbert 
(1984) surveyed literature on manipulative eco- 
logical experiments, mostly published during 
1974-1980, and estimated that about 27% of the 
experiments involved pseudoreplication. Heff- 
ner et al. (1996:2561) found that the frequency of 
pseudoreplication in more recent literature 
(1991-1992) had dropped but was still "dis- 
turbingly high." Stewart-Oaten (2002) provided 
some keys for recognizing pseudoreplication, 
which is not always straightforward. 
Metareplication 
At a higher level than ordinary replication is 
what I term metareplication. Metareplication in- 
volves the replication of studies, preferably in dif- 
ferent years, at different sites, with different 
methodologies, and by different investigators. 
Conducting studies in different years and at dif- 
ferent sites reduces the chance that some artifact 
associated with a particular time or place caused 
the observed results; it should be unlikely that an 
unusual set of circumstances would manifest itself 
several times or, especially, at several sites. Con- 
ducting studies with different methods similarly 
reassures us that the results were not simply due 
to the methods or equipment employed to get 
those results. And having more than 1 investigator 
perform studies of similar phenomena reduces 
the opportunity for the results to be due to some 
hidden bias or characteristic of that researcher. 
Just as replication within individual studies 
reduces the influence of errors in observations by 
averaging the errors, metareplication reduces the 
influence of errors among studies themselves. 
Youden (1972) provided a classic example of 
the need for metareplication. He described the 
sequence of 15 studies conducted during 
1895-1961 to estimate the average distance be- 
tween Earth and the sun. Each scientist obtained 
an estimate, as well as a confidence interval for 
that estimate. Every estimate obtained was outside 
the confidence interval for the previous estimate! 
The confidence each investigator had in his esti- 
mate thus was severely overrated. The critical mes- 
sage from this saga is that we should have far less 
confidence in any individual study than we are led 
to believe from internal estimates of reliability. 
This also points out the need to conduct studies 
of any phenomenon in different circumstances, 
with different methods, and by different investi- 
gators. That is, to do metareplication. 
Allied to this reasoning is Levins' notion of 
truth lying at the "intersection of independent 
lies" (Levins 1966:423). He considered alternative 
models, each of which suffered from I or more 
simplifying assumptions (and all models involve 
some simplification of the system being mod- 
eled) that made each model unrealistic in some 
way or another. He suggested that if the mod- 
els-despite their differing assumptions-lead to 
similar results, we have a robust finding that is 
relatively free of the details of each model. In the 
context of metareplication, although indepen- 
dent studies of some phenomenon each may suf- 
fer from various shortcomings, if they paint 
substantially similar pictures, we can have confi- 
dence in what we see. 
The idea of robustness in data analysis is analo- 
gous to robustness among studies. Robustness in 
the analysis of data from a single study means that 
the conclusions are not strongly dependent on the 
assumptions involved in the analysis (Mallows 
1979). Similar inferences would be obtained from 
statistical methods that differ in their assumptions. 
For example, conclusions might not vary even if 
the data do not follow the assumed distribution, 
such as the Normal, or if outliers are present in the 
data. Analogously, robustness in metareplication 
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means that similar interpretations about phenom- 
ena are reached from studies that differ in meth- 
ods, investigators, locations, times, etc. 
The notion that studies should be replicated 
certainly is not new. Replication, in the form of 
repetition of key experiments by others, has been 
conventional practice in science far longer than 
statistics itself has been (Carpenter 1990). Fisher 
(1971) observed that conclusions are always provi- 
sional, like progress reports, interpreting the evi- 
dence so far accrued. Tukey (1960) proposed that 
conclusions derive from the assessment of a series 
of individual results, rather than a particular re- 
sult. Eberhardt and Thomas (1991:57) observed 
that "truly definitive single experiments are very 
rare in any field of endeavor, progress is actually 
made through sequences of investigations." Cox 
and Wermuth (1996:10) noted that, "Of course, 
deep understanding is unlikely to be achieved by a 
single study, no matter how carefully planned." 
Hurlbert and White (1993:149) suggested that, 
although serious statistical errors were rampant in 
at least 1 area of ecology, principal conclusions, 
"those concerning phenomena that have been 
studied by several investigators, have been unaf- 
fected." And Catchpole (1989:287) stated that, 
"Most hypotheses are tested, not in the splendid 
isolation of one finely controlled 'perfect' exper- 
iment, but in the wider context of a whole series 
of experiments and observations. Surely a much 
more valuable form of validity comes from the 
independent repetition of experiments by col- 
leagues in different parts of the world." As sum- 
marized by Anderson et al. (2001:312), "In the 
long run, science is safeguarded by repeated 
studies to ascertain what is real and what is mere- 
ly a spurious result from a single study." 
MORE ON METAREPLICATION 
What's P Got to Do With It? 
P-values resulting from statistical tests of null 
hypotheses often are used to judge the signifi- 
cance of findings from a study. A small P-value 
suggests either that the null hypothesis is not true 
or that an unusual result has occurred. P-values 
often are misinterpreted as: (1) the probability 
that the results were due to chance, (2) an indi- 
cation of the reliability of the result, or (3) the 
probability that the null hypothesis is true (Carv- 
er 1978, Johnson 1999). Small P-values are taken 
to represent strong evidence that the null 
hypothesis is false, but in reality the connection 
between P and Pr{H0 is trueldatal is nebulous 
(Berger and Sellke 1987). 
R. A. Fisher was an early advocate of P-values, 
but he actually recommended that they be used 
opposite to the way they are mostly used now. 
Fisher viewed a significant P-value as providing 
reason to continue studying the phenomenon 
(recalling that either the hypothesis was wrong or 
something unusual happened). In stark contrast, 
modern researchers often use nonsignificant P- 
values as reason to continue study; many investi- 
gators, when faced with nonsignificant results, 
argue that, "a larger sample size [i.e., further 
research] is needed to reach significance." 
The Importance of Consistent Methods in 
Replication 
Scientists are encouraged to replicate studies 
using the same methods as were used in the orig- 
inal studies. This practice eliminates variation due 
to methodology and, if different results are 
obtained, suggests that the initial results may have 
been an accident (Table 2). That is, they did not 
bear up under metareplication. Obtaining the 
same results when using the same methods, how- 
ever, allows for the possibility that the results were 
specific to the method, rather than a general truth. 
Replication with different methods is critical to 
determine whether results are robust with 
respect to methodology and not an artifact of the 
methods employed. When we get consistent 
results with different methods, we have greater 
confidence in those results; the results are robust 
Table 2. There are both advantages and disadvantages to replicating a study with the same or different methods as the original 
study. 
Methods of original and Results from original and replicated studies 
replicated studies Same Different 
Same Results may have been specific to method, Original results may have been accidental, 
rather than a general truth not bearing up under metareplication 
Different Results are robust with respect to method Results may have been an artifact of the 
method used 
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with respect to method. Should we get different 
results when different methods are used, the 
original results may have been artifacts of the 
methods (Table 2). 
What to Do With Surprises? 
A cogent argument has been made that only 
well-thought-out hypotheses should be tested in a 
study. Doing so avoids "fishing expeditions" and 
the chance of claiming that accidental findings 
are real (Johnson 1981, Rexstad et al. 1988, 
Anderson et al. 2001, Burnham and Anderson 
2002). I think that surprise findings in fact should 
be considered, but not as confirmed results from 
the study so much as prods for further investiga- 
tions. They generate hypotheses to test. For 
example, suppose you conduct a regression 
analysis involving many explanatory variables. If 
you use a stepwise procedure to select variables, 
results from that analysis can give very misleading 
estimates of effect sizes, P-values, and the like 
(Pope and Webster 1972, Hurvich and Tsai 1990). 
Variables deemed to be important may or may 
not actually have major influence on the 
response variable, and conclusions to that effect 
should not be claimed. It is appropriate, on the 
other hand, to use the results in a further investi- 
gation, focusing on the explanatory variables that 
the analysis had suggested were influential. It is 
better to conduct a new study (i.e., to metarepli- 
cate), but at a minimum cross-validation will be 
useful. In that approach, a model is developed 
with part of the data set and evaluated on the 
remaining data. This is not to suggest that a pri- 
ori hypotheses are not important, or that careful- 
ly designed studies to evaluate those hypotheses 
are not a highly appropriate way to conduct sci- 
ence. Only that a balance between exploratory 
and confirmatory research is needed. Studies 
should be designed to learn something, not mere- 
ly to generate questions for further research. 
Apparent findings need to be rigorously con- 
firmed. If scientists look only at variables known 
or suspected to be influential, however, how 
would we get new findings? 
Meta-analysis 
Meta-analysis essentially is an analysis of analy- 
ses (Hedges and Olkin 1985, Osenberg et al. 
1999, Gurevitch and Hedges 2001). The units 
being analyzed are themselves analyses. Meta- 
analysis dates back to 1904, when Karl Pearson 
grouped data from various military tests and con- 
cluded that vaccination against intestinal fever 
was ineffective (Mann 1994). Often studies of 
comparable effects are analyzed by vote counting: 
of the studies that looked for the effect, this many 
had statistically significant results and that many 
did not. One problem with the vote-counting 
approach is that, if the true effect is not strong 
and sample sizes are not large, most studies will 
not detect the effect. So a critical review of the 
studies would conclude that most studies found 
no effect, and the effect would be dismissed. 
In contrast, meta-analysis examines the full 
range of estimated effects (not P-values), whether 
or not they were individually statistically signifi- 
cant. From the resulting pattern may emerge evi- 
dence of consistent effects, even if they are small. 
Mann (1994) cited several instances in which 
meta-analyses led to dramatically different con- 
clusions than did expert reviews of studies that 
used vote-counting methods. Meta-analysis does 
have a serious danger, however, in publication 
bias (Berlin et al. 1989). A study that demon- 
strates an effect at a statistically significant level is 
more likely to be written for publication, favor- 
ably reviewed by referees and editors, and ulti- 
mately published than is a study without such sig- 
nificant effects (Sterling et al. 1995). So the 
published literature on an effect may give a very 
biased picture of what the research in toto 
demonstrated. (The medical community worries 
that ineffective and even harmful medical prac- 
tices may be adopted if positive results are more 
likely to be published than negative results [Hof- 
fert 1998]. Indeed, an on-line journal, the Journal 
of Negative Results in Biomedicine, is being launched 
to correct distortions caused by a general bias 
against null results [Anonymous 2002].) Even if 
results from unpublished studies could be 
accessed, much care would be needed to evaluate 
them. Bailar (1995) observed that quality meta- 
analysis requires expertise in the subject matter 
reviewed. A question always looms about unpub- 
lished studies (Hoffert 1998): Was the study not 
published because it generated no statistically sig- 
nificant results or because it was flawed in some 
way? Further, could it be that the study was not 
published because it was contrary to the prevail- 
ing thinking at the time? Yet, despite the con- 
cerns with meta-analysis, it does provide a vehicle 
for thoughtfully conducting a synthesis of the 
studies relevant to a particular question. 
Weak Studies May Be OK, But ... 
Statisticians, including myself (Johnson 1974), 
regularly advise against conducting studies that 
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lack sufficient power. Observations in those stud- 
ies are too few to yield a high probability of reject- 
ing some null hypothesis, even if the hypothesis is 
false. While large samples are certainly preferable 
to small samples, I no longer believe that it is 
appropriate to condemn studies with small sam- 
ples. Indeed, it may be preferable to have the re- 
sults of numerous small but well-designed studies 
rather than results from a single "definitive" inves- 
tigation. This is so because the single study, despite 
large samples, may have been compromised by an 
unusual happenstance or by the effect of a "lurk- 
ing variable" (a third variable that induces a cor- 
relation between 2 other variables that are other- 
wise unrelated). Numerous small studies, due to 
the benefits of metareplication, are less at jeop- 
ardy of yielding misleading conclusions. 
One danger of a small study is that the sampled 
units do not adequately represent the target popu- 
lation. Lack of representation also can plague larg- 
er studies, however. I suspect that the greatest dan- 
ger of a small study is the tendency to accept the 
null hypothesis as truth, if it is not rejected. Con- 
cluding that a hypothesis is true simply because it 
was not rejected in a statistical test is folly. Nonethe- 
less, it is done frequently; Johnson (1999, 2002) 
cited numerous instances in which authors of The 
Journal of Wildlife Management articles concluded 
that null hypotheses were true, even when samples 
were small and test statistics were nearly significant. 
Metareplication protects against situations in 
which there is an effect, but it is small and there- 
fore not statistically significant in individual stud- 
ies, and thus is never claimed. Hence, small stud- 
ies should not be discouraged, as long as the 
investigators acknowledge that they are not defin- 
itive. Studies should be designed to address the 
topic as effectively and efficiently as possible. If 
the scope has to be narrow and the scale has to be 
small, or if logistic constraints preclude large sam- 
ples, results still may be worthwhile and should 
be published, with their limitations acknowl- 
edged. Without meta-analysis or a similar strate- 
gy, any values of small studies will not be realized. 
Should Authors Avoid Management 
Recommendations? 
This journal encourages authors to present 
management implications deriving from the stud- 
ies they describe. That practice may not always be 
appropriate. Results from a single study, unless 
supported by evidence from other studies, may be 
misleading. The fact that a study is the only one 
dealing with a certain species in a particular state 
is no reason to base management recommenda- 
tions solely on that single study. Recommenda- 
tions should be based on a larger body of knowl- 
edge. Similarly, manuscripts should be considered 
for publication even if they are not "ground- 
breaking," but instead provide support for infer- 
ences originally obtained from previous studies. 
What about "management studies"? These seem 
to be studies conducted by others than scientists 
or graduate students. They also are claimed to be 
in less need of quality (good design, adequate 
sample size, etc.) than are "research studies." I 
would argue that the reverse may in fact be true: 
Management studies should at least equal re- 
search investigations in quality. If an erroneous 
conclusion is reached in a research study, the 
only negative consequence is the publication of 
that error in a journal. And, hopefully, further 
investigation will demonstrate that the published 
conclusion was unwarranted. In contrast, an erro- 
neous conclusion reached in a management 
study may well lead to some very inappropriate 
management action being taken, with negative 
consequences to wildlife and their habitats. 
Metareplication and the Bayesian Approach 
The Bayesian philosophy offers a more natural 
way to think about metareplication than does the 
traditional (frequentist) approach. In concept, a 
frequentist considers only the likelihood func- 
tion, acting as if the only information about a vari- 
able under investigation derives from the study at 
hand. A Bayesian accounts for the context and 
history more explicitly by considering the likeli- 
hood in conjunction with the prior distribution. 
The prior incorporates what is known or believed 
about the variable before the study was conduct- 
ed. I think people naturally tend to be Bayesians. 
They have what might be termed mental inertia: 
they tend to continue in their existing beliefs 
even in the face of evidence against those beliefs. 
Only with repeated doses of new evidence do 
they change their opinions. Sterne and Smith 
(2001) suggested that the public, by being cynical 
about the results of new medical studies, were 
exhibiting a subconscious Bayesianism. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Any imaginative wildlife biologist can easily list a 
dozen or more variables that could influence a 
response variable of interest, be it the number of 
squirrels in a woodlot, the nest success rate of 
bobolinks (Dolichonyx oryzivorus) in a field, or the 
survival rate of mallards in a particular year. An 
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investigation of such a response variable will ade- 
quately determine the influences of only a few of 
the multitude of explanatory variables. The 
remainder will not be under the investigator's 
control and indeed may not even be known to the 
investigator, or may be known but not measured. 
The extent to which these other variables influ- 
ence the response variable confounds the ob- 
served relationship between the response vari- 
able and the explanatory variables under study. 
In addition, those unknown influences may 
restrict the scope of inference for the relation- 
ships that are discovered. 
Consider again our example of estimating the 
effect on squirrel density of selectively logging 
woodlots. Suppose that, in general, such logging 
does reduce squirrel density. In any particular sit- 
uation, however, that result might not follow 
because of the effects of other (possibly unmea- 
sured) variables. Predators of squirrels in a logged 
woodlot might have been reduced, offsetting any 
population decline associated with logging. Or 
an outbreak of disease in the squirrels might have 
reduced their numbers in the unlogged woodlot, 
erasing any difference between that woodlot and 
the one that was logged. 
Design control (restricting the range in varia- 
tion of potentially confounding variables) 
reduces the influence of such variables, but that 
practice is not always feasible. Randomization 
tends to make variables that are not studied act, 
well, randomly, rather than in some consistent 
direction. With replication, those variables then 
contribute to variance in the observed relation- 
ship, rather than a bias. Nonetheless, in any sin- 
gle study, those unobserved relationships may 
give us a misleading impression of the true rela- 
tionship between the response variable and the 
explanatory variables under study. 
Metareplication provides us greater confidence 
that certain relationships are general. Obtaining 
consistent inferences from studies conducted 
under a wide variety of conditions will assure us 
that the conclusions are not unique to the partic- 
ular set of circumstances that prevailed during the 
study. Further, by metareplicating studies, we 
need not worry about P-values, issues of what con- 
stitute independent observations, and other con- 
cerns involving single studies. We can take a broad- 
er look, seeking consistency of effects among 
studies. Consistent results suggest generality of 
the relationship. Inconsistency will lead us either 
not to accept the results as truth or to determine 
conditions under which the results hold and 
those under which they do not. That approach 
will lead to understanding the mechanisms. 
If, indeed, most individual wildlife studies are 
flawed to some degree, why have we any confi- 
dence whatsoever in the science? Perhaps the 
errors are inconsequential. Or, possibly we don't 
really believe in those single studies anyway, and 
don't take action until a clear pattern emerges 
from disparate studies of the phenomenon. Our 
innate Bayesianism may be weighting results 
from an individual study with our prior thinking, 
based on other things we know or believe. 
To conclude, we certainly should use the best 
statistical methods appropriate for a given data 
set to maximize the value of those data. However, 
as Hurlbert (1994:495) wisely noted, "lack of 
understanding of basic principles and simple 
methods by practising ecologists is a serious prob- 
lem, while under-use of advanced statistical meth- 
ods is not." More important than the methods 
used to analyze data, we should collect the best 
data we can. We should use the principles of 
design-controls, randomization, and replica- 
tion in manipulative experiments; matching and 
measuring appropriate covariates in observation- 
al studies. And, most critically, studies themselves 
need to be replicated to have confidence in the 
findings and their generality. Metareplication 
exploits the value of small studies, obviates con- 
cerns about P-values and similar issues, protects 
against claiming spurious effects to be real, and 
facilitates the detection of small effects that are 
likely to be missed in individual studies. 
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